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Abstract: 
The essay anthology Undienlichkeit, written by Iris Därmann, assembles a history of 
violence and slavery. The book intersects European philosophies of subservience and 
forms of passive resistance, drawing special attention to spaces of violence by means of 
philosophical theories, historical, literary, and visual sources and a special focus on 
material cultures. It traverses a broad length of contexts, from slavery in ancient Greece 
to Auschwitz. 
Die Zoologische Schwelle der Sklaverei 
German Abstract: 
Iris Därmanns Anthologie Undienlichkeit stellt eine Geschichte der Gewalt und Sklaverei 
zusammen. Das Buch ‚überkreuzt‘ europäische Philosophien der Dienlichkeit mit Formen 
des passiven Widerstands, mit einem besonderen Schwerpunkt auf Gewalträumen. Das 
Buch illustriert diese Geschichte mittels philosophischer Theorien, historischer, 
literarischer und visueller Quellen und einem speziellen Augenmerk auf materiellen 
Kulturen. Es überquert dabei vielfältige Kontexte von Sklaverei in der griechischen Antike 
bis zu Auschwitz. 
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The Zoological Threshold of Slavery 
Juan Camilo Brigard 
Justus Liebig University Giessen 
Därmann, Iris. Undienlichkeit. Gewaltgeschichte und politische Philosophie. Berlin: Matthes & 
Seitz, 2020. 512 pages, 38.00 EUR. ISBN 978-3-95757-874-7. 
The essays compiled in Iris Därmann’s Undienlichkeit (Unsubservience; all translations mine) 
question the use of legitimizing discourses of violence to exploit others. They do so by 
painstakingly illustrating the suffering and the resistance they have historically encountered. 
The book takes a humanist point of view to stress the political necessity of contextualizing 
historically the institutional perpetrators of slavery in English and German philosophy, such as 
T. Hobbes, J. Locke, C. Schmitt, and M. Heidegger. Moreover, it lays emphasis on the discursive 
implication in human subservience of other canonic Western philosophers, like K. Marx and H. 
Arendt. Därmann carries out this task by applying the concept of “unsubservience,” which aims 
at counterbalancing and deconstructing these philosophies by making visible the forms of 
suffering and passive resistance of the exploited. These are analyzed in extreme situations of 
spaces of violence and their symbolic synthesis in visual and material cultures, such as slave 
ships, plantations, concentration camps, daguerreotypes, postcards, photographs, exhibitions, 
tattoos, and the whip.  
Half of the chapters of the book focus on the aforementioned philosophers and give a 
differentiated outline of their roles, either as perpetrators or, to use Michael Rothberg’s 
expression, “implicated subjects” of exploitation (see his The Implicated Subject. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2019). The other half of the chapters emphasize material and visual 
cultures. This review will limit itself to the former and warn that its audience might be limited 
to philosophers or readers familiar with critical theory. This limitation is evident in her 
deconstructive style and her Deleuzean profusion of neologisms. From a methodological point 
of view, one of its strengths is how the book contextualizes historically the philosophical texts 
it analyzes, operating simultaneously at a historical and a theoretical level. It carefully compiles 
old and recent readings, and, in some cases, even archival research. Moreover, the essays go 
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beyond a victim-perpetrator paradigm, by intersecting and critically tensing the discourse of 
the passive-resisters with that of the oppressors.  
The chapters dedicated to the well-known “Nazi philosopher[s]” (see p. 237, 262) recall not only 
their racist, colonial, xenophobic, and antisemitic political philosophies but their annihilating 
consequences. Därmann reconfirms the widely accepted opinion of Schmitt as the legal 
“‘mastermind of extermination’” (p. 34) by studying his antisemitic “way of the masks” (p. 206).  
Similarly, but with an emphasis on the concepts of “work state” and “destructive work” —a 
work untouched by the vulnerability and mortality of the other— are her interpretations of 
Heidegger’s racist, colonial, xenophobic and antisemitic textual production during the Third 
Reich, strongly influenced by Ernst Jünger and other prominent Nazis. The meaning of these 
chapters goes beyond a philosophical Vergangenheitsbewältigung, by being assembled besides 
the English slave “stockholders” (p. 34), filiated in the continuum of the political agenda of 
human exploitation. 
Hobbes’ disrepute as “the founder [...] of state terror” (p. 80) is presented in an unexpected 
fashion. It not only points at his renowned philosophy of absolute sovereignty, but correlates it 
with its legitimizing function of his undivulged personal engagement with colonial and slave 
trade enterprises. Along these lines is Därmann’s reading of Locke, “the colonial philosophical 
founder of tricontinental capitalism” (p. 103). His liberal political philosophy is contextualized 
in relationship to his role as the manager of the colonial enterprises of Lord Ashley in South 
Carolina. In this light, the Enlightenment thinker appears as the architect of the triple capitalist 
exploitative constellation of transatlantic slave trade, plantation economy, and commodity 
production on the verge of industrialization (see p. 103). 
A common thread through Därmann’s reading of these European philosophers is their “political 
zoology” (p. 58, 100, 248, 297) — the instrumental and exploitative distinction between humans 
and animals, and its specific use to animalize and exploit other human beings. The chapters 
dedicated to Marx and Arendt are possibly the most eye-opening from this perspective. This 
scope leads her to pinpoint how Marx’s and Engel’s critique of the US-American civil war and 
political economy operates within a racist humanism. It show how it rhetorically builds a 
hierarchy of suffering between “white” and “black slaves,” for the benefit of the former, 
dodging systematically the latter’s forms of political resistance (p. 164-5). This distinction is 
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ultimately based on the Marxist understanding of freedom as an intimate consent with human 
violence, as the capacity to abstain from its unnecessary use and as a freedom to deploy 
violence against other animals (p. 180). Därmann stresses this animal-human distinction in the 
chapter dedicated to Arendt’s concept of the political in relation to her analyses of 
concentration camps. Arendt defines the political in terms of the Aristotelian-slaveholder 
distinction between oikos and polis, a division, Därmann argues, that runs the risk of iterating 
and doubling Nazi political zoology (see p. 297 and p. 302).  
The book has two shortcomings. It does not reflect on its own position regarding an 
“interlocking” of “systems of oppression” (Combahee River Collective: Feminist Theory Reader. 
Local and Global Perspectives. New York: Routledge 2013, p. 116). This is unfortunate, especially 
considering its prosecuting tone and its strategic pointing at many authors’ self-reflexive 
blindness from the comfort of a historical distance, in varying degrees. This is a clear limitation 
compared, for instance, with G.C. Spivak’s work, which also intersects resistance and violence, 
and shares a very similar poststructuralist filiation, while not looking away from the researcher’s 
implication. (Despite the fact she is clearly aware of Spivak’s work: see Iris Därmann 
“Widerstands- und Gewaltforschung, überkreuz,” in Kuturwissenschaftliche Zeitschrift 1/2019, 
p. 7, FN. 5). From this angle, Undienlichkeit seems to pass over conveniently the implied 
procedures of access to discourse and the positionality of its enunciation. In other words, how 
images and words serve the qualified scholar as an implicated beneficiary, when speaking for 
and representing passive-resisters and active-perpetrators. This shortcoming of the essay 
anthology would be easier to overlook if the only clue for an answer were not a footnote in a 
book from 2020 that refers to a programmatic text to be published in 2021 (see note 135, p. 318, 
referring to Iris Därmann: Widerstände. Geschichte und Theorie. Berlin: Mattes & Seitz, 2021). 
This may appear as a marketing strategy of the author and the publishing house, to commodify 
and institutionalize this intersecting method of violence and resistance, an interpretation that 
makes her structural positionality conspicuous by its absence. Secondly, the methodological 
novelty it attributes itself, in terms of crosshatching resistance and violence studies, is limited 
to a German academic field (see p. 36). However, in a broader one, this intersection is not new; 
it can also be read in the volumes published during the last decade, in the midst of the ongoing 
Colombian conflict, by the National Center for Historical Memory. 
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But Därmann’s essay anthology is a clear contribution to the historization of European 
philosophy, to the extent that if there is any hope for the dazzling ideals of its Enlightenment, 
it lies in the dark, suppressed, and marginalized minoritarian traditions it has not only 
neglected, but enslaved, commodified, and animalized. This is worth remarking, considering 
the fact that it is done from the inside of the ‘land of ideas’ and ‘thinkers,’ with a humanist 
discourse that focalizes its own limit on the threshold of mankind’s animality. An in-
betweenness Undienlichkeit cannot comprehend and which expresses unintentionally that, if 
there’s still some hope to it in the reflection of its self-understanding, it lies in and can only be 
salvaged beyond its own tradition of anthropocentric intelligibility. 
  
